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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Authentication is a crucial tool used in access control mechanisms to verify a 
user’s identity. Collaborative Authentication (co-authentication) is a newly proposed 
authentication scheme designed to improve on traditional token authentication. Co-
authentication works by using multiple user devices as tokens to collaborate in a 
challenge and authenticate a user request on single device. 
 This thesis adds two contributions to the co-authentication project. First, a 
detailed survey of applications that are suitable for adopting co-authentication is 
presented. Second, an analysis of tradeoffs between varying protocol designs of co-
authentication is performed to determine whether, and how, any designs are superior to 
other designs. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Access control, in the fields of physical security and information security, is a 
process for providing protection of an object or resource against unauthorized access 
by setting limitations on the interactions a subject can make on them [20]. 
Authentication is the process of verifying that a person or piece of data claiming an 
attribute is true and is a crucially important tool for implementing proper access control 
because it ensures that a person is who they say they are [3], [22].  
 
1.1  Overview of Related Work 
This section provides an overview of the authentication schemes; more details 
appear in Chapter 2.  
There are three main factors used in various authentication methods: passwords, 
biometric identifiers and tokens [22]. Password authentication involves remembering a 
secret phrase or password and presenting it when requesting access to a system or 
resource. An authenticator checks the presented password with a stored password to 
determine if access should be granted. Biometric authentication uses an identifier 
unique to a user such as a fingerprint, retina scan, facial recognition, etc. to perform 
authentication. The third authentication factor is using a physical token as a key. Token 
authentication was traditionally performed using a metal key that would unlock a lock 
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but the state of the art has evolved to using electronic devices with cryptographic 
protocols to transmit a digital key which provides more security and convenience. This 
factor is susceptible to theft attacks where an adversary steals a token or key and uses 
it to access a system or resource unpermitted to them. 
Each of these authentication factors has its own caveats that can render them 
vulnerable to attacks. One solution is to combine two or more of these factors together, 
called multi-factored authentication, such as using physical tokens in conjunction with 
passwords or biometrics. Multi-factored methods can provide added security but lack 
convenience and still suffer many of the caveats of the single-factor methods that make 
it up. 
 
1.2  Collaborative Authentication 
Recent work from a research group at the University of South Florida has 
proposed a new authentication protocol called Collaborative Authentication (co-
authentication) [12], [13], [14]. Co-authentication is an authentication scheme designed 
to improve on traditional authentication in several ways, including (1) mitigating 
vulnerability to theft-based attacks on token authentication, (2) also mitigating 
vulnerability to device loss and denial-of-service attacks, and (3) possibly better usability 
than other authentication schemes. Co-authentication is a single-factor authentication 
scheme that makes use of multiple associated user devices as hardware tokens to 
authenticate a request on a single a device. One or more of the associated user devices 
is required to collaborate with the requester in a challenge to perform authentication and 
grant access to the requesting device.  
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Co-authentication has been carefully designed with the pitfalls of token 
authentication in mind. By requiring multiple associated user devices to be present to 
pass authentication, unwarranted access will no longer be granted to a single token that 
has been lost, stolen or copied. By having multiple associated devices in a trusted set 
participate in the authentication process a user can still pass authentication even if they 
forget to carry a device. Co-authentication also does not require auxiliary hardware such 
as a hardware token because the all of the functionality can be performed on devices 
users already own, such as phones, laptops, etc. 
The research group has submitted two patent applications on the topic of 
collaborative authentication, one of which has been awarded [12], [13], [14]. The group 
furthermore hypothesizes that the new scheme has usability advantages while 
mitigating some of the vulnerabilities surrounding token authentication. By using tokens 
instead of passwords, users aren’t required to remember long and difficult phrases. 
Also, co-authentication can be configured to automatically request access and perform 
authentication when within a certain proximity, providing a more hands-free option for 
users. Co-authentication also mitigates attacks wherein a token is stolen or lost and 
used for unwarranted access by requiring at least one other device collaborate in the 
authentication process.  
 
1.3  Contributions and Overview  
I have recently joined the research group working on collaborative authentication. 
My contribution to this project will come in two forms. First, this thesis is the first work to 
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present a detailed (but non-exhaustive) survey1 of applications well suited to use co-
authentication (in Chapter 3). Second, this thesis analyzes the tradeoffs between 
varying designs of the authentication scheme to determine whether there are any 
implementations clearly superior (in Chapter 4). 
 The following chapter provides a detailed background of the related work 
surrounding co-authentication.  
                                                
1 All the applications surveyed are embodiments of co-authentication as described in the patent 
applications [13], [14]. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
RELATED WORK 
 
This chapter provides a detailed background on the related work surrounding co-
authentication. First, it discusses the single-factored authentication schemes along with 
their strengths and weaknesses. Multi-factored authentication is discussed as a solution 
to combat some of the pitfalls that the single factors pose. Lastly, co-authentication is 
explained in technical detail to give an understanding of the protocols that are discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
 
2.1  Single-Factored Authentication 
Typically, there are three main factors used in performing authentication: 
passwords, biometric identifiers, and physical tokens [3], [22]. Each of these factors 
provides their own unique tradeoffs between security, convenience, and cost. 
 
2.1.1 Passwords 
Passwords are a form of authentication using “what you know” [7]. This is usually 
done by requiring a user to remember a secret phrase or password and present it when 
requesting authentication [19]. Passwords are a commonly used single-factor 
authentication mechanism that are cost-efficient without the need for extra hardware [1], 
[8], [10], [15], [16], [18], [23], [28]. However, it is inconvenient for most users to 
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remember a password for all the different resources they need to protect. A 2013 Ofcom 
study shows that 35% of internet users have difficulty remembering their passwords. 
The study also showed that 55% of users use the same password for all of their internet 
accounts [19]. Another study shows that users care more to have a password that’s 
easier to remember than hard to guess [28]. Thus, passwords can be susceptible to 
brute force or other guessing attacks, and once a user’s password is stolen it can likely 
be used to access all their internet accounts. It is also nearly impossible to detect that 
someone knows your password until you begin to notice malicious activity on your 
account. This problem makes frequently changing passwords an inconvenient, but 
needed requirement for providing adequate security. 
 
2.1.2 Biometrics 
Authentication using biometric identifiers is a method of authentication using 
“what you are” or a unique characteristic of a user’s person [7], [ 22]. This would include 
using things such as a fingerprint, palm print, retina scan, facial recognition or DNA. 
Authentication using biometrics also requires additional hardware sensors not needed 
by other methods of authentication, increasing the cost of production. Biometric systems 
face issues with accuracy as developers have to determine how strict to configure 
authenticators. Overly-strict authenticators could deny proper access to a user and 
lenient authenticators could allow improper access to an unauthorized user [24]. 
Biometrics is more of an identity-based mechanism for authentication and doesn’t 
depend on secrecy [7]. It is much harder to steal biometric information to impersonate a 
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user than passwords or tokens but is also much harder problem to address once 
they’ve been stolen because it’s not as simple as resetting a password [7]. 
 
2.1.3 Physical Tokens 
Token authentication is a form of authentication using “what you have” such as a 
physical token or key [7]. Traditionally, token-based authentication used a metal key 
and a lock designed to only open when that key is inserted. Digital tokens, such as 
smart cards and key fobs, have begun to replace metal keys and use cryptographic 
protocols to transmit keys to an authenticating body when requesting access. This can 
be convenient for users because it doesn’t require them to remember a difficult 
password. An example of this is how some newer automobiles use an electronic key 
that can unlock the door without the use of a metal key when entering a certain range. 
An advantage this authentication method has over the others discussed is that users 
will most likely notice when a token becomes lost or stolen. When a token is lost or 
stolen the user can unregister it to prevent anyone else access. However, this 
authentication mechanism is still susceptible to theft attacks [24]. In the event that a 
user’s physical token gets into the hands of an unwanted adversary, their resources 
become vulnerable until the token is unregistered from the authenticating body [9].  
 
2.2  Multi-Factored Authentication 
Multi-factor authentication is a proposed solution to combat a lot of the varying 
problems that these single-factor mechanisms face by using them in conjunction [26], 
[2], [17]. An example is a two-factor scheme using a physical token and a password for 
 8 
authentication. If the physical token gets stolen, the system still remains inaccessible to 
the adversary until they can provide the correct password as well. This scheme provides 
more security than a traditional token-based scheme but adds the inconvenience of 
remembering a complex password. 
Another example of a multi-factored authentication scheme is using a physical 
token mixed with a biometric identifier for authentication. In the event that a hardware 
token gets stolen, an adversary will still be required to replicate your identity, and if a 
user’s identity gets stolen, an adversary will still be required to steal the hardware token 
to gain unwarranted access. This two-factor authentication example also helps to 
improve the security of the traditional token-based approach but adds the unreliability 
and extra hardware costs that come with using biometrics. 
A big disadvantage of multi-factored authentication schemes relates to usability 
[4].  Both 2-factor authentication schemes described above, informally speaking, double 
the amount of work a user has to do. Using passwords with tokens requires a user to 
remember a password and carry additional hardware tokens on them. The second 
example, using tokens and biometrics, also has major usability issues. A user must 
remember to carry their token hardware on them and submit a biometric identifier that 
requires expensive hardware accompanied with accuracy caveats. 
 
2.3 Collaborative Authentication 
 Collaborative Authentication, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is an 
authentication scheme designed to improve on traditional authentication in several 
ways, including (1) mitigating vulnerability to theft-based attacks on token 
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authentication, (2) also mitigating vulnerability to device loss and denial-of-service 
attacks, and (3) possibly better usability than other authentication schemes. 
 Co-authentication works by having multiple user devices participate in 
authentication. A user has n devices registered to a trusted set of associated user 
devices where n is two or greater [12], [13], [14]. In the simplest implementation, to be 
granted authorization to a protected resource a user is required to perform 
authentication with m devices, where m is greater than or equal to two and less than or 
equal to n (2 ≤ m ≤ n). More complex employments could require specific devices 
collaborate, disallow certain devices from collaborating, etc. 
 People are starting to carry multiple devices with them on a daily basis making 
co-authentication a suitable solution for day-to-day authenticating needs. Users 
commonly carry devices such as a smartphone, smartwatch, tablet, laptop, smart 
glasses, fitness monitors, etc. all of which would require no auxiliary hardware to 
perform co-authentication. Even devices such as smart rings, smart jewelry, RFID tags 
and other wearable items that are currently not developed could be suitable candidates 
for co-authentication. Applications and protocols discussed in this thesis will mostly 
depict co-authentication using a smartphone and smartwatch because they are 
currently more common but hypothetically any type of device could be used. 
 Before being able to perform authentication, user devices need to go through a 
registration process to join the group of associated devices. During registration, the 
devices will receive a private key to encrypt communications. Co-authentication 
assumes the integrity of the registration process and that associated devices are 
properly assigned private keys. 
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 Figure 2.1 depicts a simple scenario requiring m = 2 devices to authenticate has 
3 devices involved: (1) one protecting resources a user would like to access called the 
Authenticator and two user devices, (2) one requesting access called the Requester 
and (3) one that is used to verify a challenge known as a Collaborator [12], [13], [14]. 
There are many possible variations of the protocol that are analyzed by their tradeoffs in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Figure 2.1: Diagram depicting co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. A requesting 
device uses one other associated user device to collaborate in a challenge to 
successfully authenticate to a system protected by an Authenticator.  
 
The protocol starts by a device sending a request message to the Authenticator 
containing its identification and a timestamp, signed by its private key [12], [13], [14]. 
The Authenticator receives the request message, decrypts it, and confirms the 
Requester is valid. Upon a valid request, a challenge is generated by the Authenticator 
and returned to the Requester. The Requester forwards the challenge to the 
Collaborator, one of the other n user devices. The Collaborator receives the challenge 
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and completes it by adding its identification and a timestamp, signing it with its private 
key, and sending the response back to the Authenticator. 
 Once the Authenticator receives the challenge response, it confirms the 
Collaborator is valid [12], [13], [14]. If the Collaborator is valid, paired with the Requester 
and provided the correct challenge originally generated by the Authenticator, then 
authentication is passed. An authentication response message is generated including a 
session key to access the system and transmitted back to the Collaborator. The 
Collaborator then forwards the authentication response message containing the session 
key back to the original Requester. 
 In summary, co-authentication can be used to require m-out-of-n devices to 
properly respond to an authenticator’s challenge.  In this way, authentication only 
occurs when a user proves, to the authenticator, possession of multiple devices. 
 Although co-authentication is a single-factor scheme (the single factor being 
hardware tokens), additional factors can also be incorporated.  For example, an 
authenticator may require a password in addition to co-authentication (this implements a 
server-side password check), or a co-authentication application (e.g., running on a client 
device) may require a password before collaborating (this implements a client-side 
password check).
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CHAPTER 3: 
SURVEY OF APPLICATIONS 
 
Co-authentication suits access control needs for many physical and informational 
security systems. This chapter will survey potential applications as embodiments of co-
authentication as described in the patent applications.  
 
3.1 Computer Applications and Webservers 
 Computers and webserver applications are some of the most common resources 
protected by authentication. Passwords are currently the most commonly used factor to 
authenticate a user digitally. They protect the files of a user on a computer, their bank 
account, social media accounts, ecommerce, secure networks, etc.  
Password authentication, however, is vulnerable to social engineering where a 
user is convinced into sharing their password or details related to it [1], [8], [10], [15], 
[16], [18], [23], [28]. Phishing attacks can be used to convince users to enter their 
credentials into a fake website or to download malware onto a user’s computer and log 
their keystrokes for a password. Because a user has to physically enter their secret, 
someone watching or monitoring surveillance cameras might see the password, or parts 
of it. It is also susceptible to brute force guessing attacks where an adversary 
exhaustively tries every possible password until the right one is found. A brute force 
attack could potentially take several years to exhaustively guess every possible 
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password, but used with information gathered from social engineering, phishing and 
eavesdropping could expedite the attack. 
Once the password for one user resource is compromised, many of their other 
accounts are susceptible to a breach because of how commonly passwords are reused. 
A CSID consumer survey on password habits found that 61% of users use the same 
password for multiple accounts and 54% of people have less 5 passwords or less [6]. If 
a compromised password is also used to authenticate to the user’s email service an 
adversary can hypothetically log in and change the passwords to all of the user 
accounts registered to that email. 
 
3.1.1 Computer Unlocking and Network Login 
Co-Authentication provides an interesting alternative to using passwords for 
authenticating to webservers and computers. Most people feel the need to lock their 
computers when stepping away but are required to reenter their password when they 
return. One of the most obvious applications is using their smartphone and smartwatch 
to authenticate to a work or home computer. The application could work by having a 
user automatically log in when they get within a certain proximity of the computer with m 
required devices. The application could also continuously check that m devices are 
within proximity and lock the computer if not.  
Assume a user carrying a smartwatch and a smartphone and m = 2 required 
devices. Using co-authentication to unlock a computer can either be a manual or 
automatic process. If a user wants to automatically log into their computer, their 
smartphone and smartwatch could be used as a requester and collaborator. The 
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computer plays the role of the authenticator. This implementation could be modeled to 
have one of the two user devices, we’ll assume the smartphone, send an authentication 
request to the computer once in a desired proximity. The authenticator could then return 
with a challenge that the smartphone must collaborate with the smartwatch to complete.  
Once logged in, the authenticator can periodically send challenges to the 
requester to be completed. Another option, if it can be guaranteed that all m devices are 
in proximity of the authenticator when access the computer, is to have the authenticator 
periodically ping each device that participated in authentication to ensure they are still in 
range. If any of the devices fail to respond, it is likely that the user left, and the 
authenticator will logout of the session. 
In some cases, it may be safer to require a user to manually log into their 
computer instead of assuming a user wishes to authenticate when a device is in range. 
A user manually logging into their computer using co-authentication could be required to 
select a user account. The authenticator could then broadcast a challenge and wait for 
m successful responses to the challenge before unlocking. In this case, requesting 
would be done by selecting a profile to log into and both user devices would be used to 
collaborate in the challenge. Another example could require a user to press a button on 
one or more of their collaborating devices to manually confirm the access request. This 
prevents an attack where a device is stolen and a collaborator unknowingly 
authenticates the requests of the stolen device. 
Both of these examples, provide advantages over using passwords. First, users 
gain the convenience of not having to enter their password every time they want to log 
into their computer and could potentially login automatically when in range. Second, 
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many of the problems password authentication faces are mitigated. Social engineering 
and surveillance is no longer effective for collecting information about the secret or key 
because the private keys are stored on the devices, unknown to the user. Guessing 
attacks are still a possibility but by requiring multiple devices participate in 
authentication, m keys would have to be consecutively guessed correctly for this attack 
to work. 
Attacks on this application would require an adversary steal/clone at least m user 
devices in order to login to their computer. A user would likely notice when a device is 
physically stolen and can unregister the device from the trusted set of devices before a 
second device is stolen. Cloned devices would be hard for a user to discover but 
devices could use rotating keys dictated by the authenticator after each successful 
authentication, making the cloned device useless after a user uses the original device 
for authentication again. One disadvantage of this application would be in the event that 
a user forgets, loses, or breaks multiple devices putting their total count below m 
devices. The user would no longer be able to authenticate to their computer without m 
devices so some type of password backup or management service needs to be in place 
to prevent locking yourself out of your resources. 
 
3.1.2 Webserver Application Login 
Another application of co-authentication is using multiple devices to authenticate 
to personal webserver accounts and applications. There could be an option when 
logging into a website for singing in using co-authentication. When the user selects this 
option, the computer the browser is running on could broadcast its availability to nearby 
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devices. A user could then manually press a button on one of their devices to request 
access and initiate co-authentication. 
A service could be created on user devices to manage web accounts, keys and 
associated devices. Whenever a user wants to authenticate to a webpage they can 
simply use their personal devices instead of remembering difficult passwords and 
worrying about the vulnerabilities that accompany them.  
There is currently an account management service similar to this called LastPass 
that generates unique passwords for each of a user’s registered web accounts to 
prevent social engineering and guessing attacks [11]. The service requires 2-factor 
authentication, using a password and a registered phone or device to confirm access. 
Once authenticated, LastPass will automatically enter login information and passwords 
when a user needs to log into a web account. This service, however, is verified with a 
single device protected by a PIN. If the PIN is discovered and the phone is stolen, an 
adversary could gain access to all of the user’s accounts. Also, if the phone is lost or 
stolen the user has no way to authenticate to any of their web accounts because 
verification happens through their phone. The user would need to prove to LastPass 
they are the actual owner to authenticate to their account and in the meantime would be 
locked out of all of their other web accounts.  
An account management service using co-authentication would still provide a lot 
of the security benefits that LastPass offers without a single device being an Achilles 
Heel. For instance, a scheme requiring two devices for co-authentication wouldn’t allow 
access if a single device is lost or stolen but would still allow the user to access their 
resources using another device. 
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3.2 Physical Access: Doors, Gates, Surveillance  
 Co-authentication also fits the requirements of physical access control 
mechanisms. Many physical access control systems currently implement token 
authentication requiring a key to gain access. For example, most doors protecting 
homes, buildings, secured rooms, cars, etc. unlock using a metal key or a keycard that 
transmits a digital key.  
 These methods of authenticating are particularly susceptible to key loss. If a 
person loses their key or an adversary steals/copies it, then someone unauthorized 
could access the physical location the door protects. Co-authentication could be used to 
mitigate the vulnerability of theft-based attacks on these applications of access control 
by forcing an adversary to obtain multiple devices from the user instead of just one key.  
 
3.2.1 Vehicle Gates 
Vehicle gates are used as authenticators in residential homes and 
neighborhoods as well as by businesses to prevent unknown people and vehicles from 
entering their facility. Some implementations have an RFID tag placed on registered 
vehicles that acts as a token. If a user’s car or the RFID tag gets stolen the thief would 
be able to gain unauthorized access to the location. Others use a keycard or 
smartphone instead that is more likely to be on the user’s person; however, this is still 
susceptible to a similar theft attack.  
Consider a scenario using co-authentication: the authenticating vehicle gate 
could require m = 2 devices, the RFID tag in the vehicle could be used as the Requester 
and a user’s smartphone or smartwatch could be used as a Collaborator. When the 
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vehicle enters in range of the gate, it initializes the authentication process with a request 
message. Users could have an option for requesting access with their smartphone and 
collaborating with their smartwatch in the event that they are in an unregistered vehicle 
but still need to access the location.  
The implementation described could prevent a stolen car or someone with a 
stolen phone from entering the gate. Depending on if access control is desired on a 
vehicular or user level, there could also be deployments of this application specifically 
requiring one of the m devices to be a registered vehicle tag. 
 
3.2.2 Building and Vehicle Doors 
 Building and vehicle doors are commonly protected with either a key or a PIN. 
PINs are subject to eavesdropping and guessing attacks and a single key can easily be 
stolen. Co-authentication provides a solution that doesn’t face these pitfalls while also 
being more usable. A person would no longer be required to remember a PIN or carry 
any extraneous keys because their everyday devices would do the work for them. 
 In an application embodied by co-authentication, the locking mechanism in the 
door can be used as the Authenticator requiring two user devices, e.g. a smartphone 
and smartwatch can be used as the Requester and Collaborator, or vice versa. 
Whenever a button on the door or the handle is pressed, the Authenticator broadcasts 
that it is accepting requests. Either the smartphone or smartwatch would be designated 
for automatically sending a request once receiving the broadcast to start the 
authentication process. The communication proximity between the user and the door 
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should be low to prevent someone from requesting access to the door with a user in 
range to authenticate but not notice the unwarranted request.  
This application could also implement a different manual step to start the 
authentication process. The user could request access to the door using their 
smartphone or watch to prevent the unwarranted request explained above. Another 
possibility could use a dedicated mobile device such as a key fob to make locking and 
unlocking requests. A user’s smartphone or smartwatch could be set to automatically 
collaborate in requests, this way the key fob only works when in proximity of another 
user device. The application could also send an alert to the collaborating device to 
require a manual acceptance before granting access. 
 Another design could have the user devices automatically request access once 
in a certain proximity of the door and automatically collaborate in the challenge. The 
door could have a mechanism to slide open once authentication is passed to provide an 
automatic opening solution. This design could be used in hospitals that need to 
transport beds between secured areas, businesses that need to transport large carts 
around different departments and any other system that desires the convenience of an 
automatic, door opening, access control solution.  
 Implementations of co-authentication could also continue to use a traditional key 
in conjunction with user devices. A traditional key could be used to request access but 
require one or multiple user devices verify the request. This would prevent unwarranted 
access in the event a physical key is lost or stolen. 
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3.3 Internet of Things 
 More and more devices are becoming “smart” and connected to an internetwork 
of other smart devices called the Internet of Things (IoT). Smart home devices such as 
thermostats, voice-activated assistants, security and surveillance systems, lights, 
kitchen appliances, TV’s, etc. are being connected to the internet to provide the 
convenience of updating and being controlled remotely. Many automobiles are having 
their locks, ignition, GPS navigation, vehicle trackers, communication devices and other 
functionalities connected as IoT solutions. Businesses such as hospitals are also 
starting to implement IoT solutions by having medical equipment and devices connected 
to track and control their uses. IoT applications require access control mechanisms to 
prevent its devices from being used for malicious use. 
 
3.3.1 Smart Home Devices and Child Proofing 
 Most smart home IoT devices can be controlled remotely by users on their 
smartphone to conveniently monitor and control the operation of their homes. An 
adversary gaining remote access to smart home applications poses a significant threat 
to the residents for obvious reasons. People who own smart homes devices need a 
robust, but convenient authentication scheme for controlling their devices and 
appliances.  
 An embodiment of co-authentication to protect remote access could require m 
devices to remotely monitor and control applications. Another embodiment could allow 
monitoring with only a single device but require m devices to control the appliance. A 
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user could use their smartphone, tablet, or computer to access their applications 
remotely and use a smartwatch and other devices they carry to collaborate. 
 Smart home applications should also require authentication for physical control 
as well to prevent malicious use by guests, children or intruders. User devices are 
connected to the smart home network so applications such as thermostats, cameras, 
security systems and kitchen appliances could adopt a scheme of co-authentication that 
uses a smartwatch to broadcast an authentication request once in proximity of an 
appliance. Another device in range could be used to collaborate in the request but this 
is inconvenient for a person having to carry multiple devices while in their home.  
Instead, smart home appliances could adopt a scheme of co-authentication that queries 
devices connected to the network for authentication. For example, if a user’s 
smartphone, smartwatch and vehicle are connected to the network, the user is home 
and likely making a valid request. This implementation could prevent appliances being 
tampered with while someone is away from there home but there is still the possibility 
for unwarranted control while they are home and do not notice. 
 To prevent this, an implementation could require a dedicated requester, such as 
a smartwatch or smartphone, be present on the user when making requests. Certain 
devices such as a vehicle or personal computer on the network would validate that a 
user is home and automatically collaborate with the requesting device. This employment 
of co-authentication compared to the previous helps prevent unnoticed changes while 
the user is home but adds inconvenience by requiring a device to be present on the 
user. 
 
 22 
3.3.2 Vehicle Devices 
 Most vehicle devices are authenticated with token authentication using a single 
key device to unlock and access functionalities. A user is vulnerable to key loss or theft 
and even carjacking once the user has started the vehicle. An embodiment of co-
authentication could be used to authenticate to vehicle devices to prevent these attacks. 
Vehicles could also use co-authentication to load user-specific settings such as seat 
position, music and common GPS locations based on which registered user is 
authenticated.  
 An implementation may replace the current key or use it in conjunction with 
other user devices to collaborate in requests. In order for an adversary to hijack or steal 
a car, they would be required to obtain multiple user devices. This may make it harder 
for an attacker to obtain than a traditional key but could put the user in danger and 
make it harder for them to evade the situation.  
Another possible scheme could continue to use a traditional key in conjunction 
with multiple user devices. If a certain number of user devices are removed from the 
vehicle but not the key, an alert could be sent to the removed device(s) inquiring about 
the situation. An option could be to report a carjacking that would shut down 
functionalities, lock the attacker inside, and alert police to the location of the vehicle. 
The victim could allow the vehicle to continue operation for a small amount of time and 
to get a safe distance before disabling the vehicle. 
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3.4 Financial Institutions and Applications  
Financial institutions are frequently the target of theft making it essential to 
provide a strong authentication scheme for accessing resources. There are many 
financial applications that co-authentication fits the security requirements for. 
 
3.4.1 ATMs 
 An automatic teller machine, universally known as an ATM, allows bank users to 
withdraw money from their accounts electronically without the need of a human. ATMs 
are accessed using a bank card with information about the account and usually a 4-digit 
PIN the user enters to verify their identity. This scheme prevents an adversary from 
stealing a user’s bank card and accessing their money without the PIN; however, ATMs 
and other financial machines can have skimmers installed that record and clone the 
cards information and the PIN without the user’s knowledge.  
ATMs using co-authentication for their authentication scheme could mitigate the 
threat of these types of attacks. By using multiple user devices to communicate with the 
ATM there is no longer a need to carry and protect a banking card or remember its PIN. 
Instead, a user could press a button on their smartwatch when in range that broadcasts 
a request to authenticate to the ATM with co-authentication. The user’s smartphone 
could then be used to automatically collaborate with the challenge or the ATM could 
prompt the user to verify the request on their smartphone first.  
Co-authentication for authenticating ATM transactions could make a suitable 
counter to credit card skimmers because they can no longer record the PIN used to 
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verify users. It also prevents access from being granted if a single user’s device is 
stolen because at least one other would be required to verify the identity.  
 
3.4.2 Mobile Payment 
 Banking and credit cards are starting to be integrated into our smart devices. 
Users are able to use their smartphone at stores and restaurants to pay for things 
without the need to carry physical cards. Co-authentication could be used to implement 
authentication for mobile payment applications. An embodied application may have a 
user register their smartphone and smartwatch to the payment service. When a 
payment is desired, a user may open an app or tap their phone to a payment scanner. 
Their smartwatch could then receive and alert that a payment request was made and 
give the user a small window of time to accept or reject the request.  
 
3.4.3 Safes and Vaults 
 People and banks use safes and vaults are used to protect physical access 
control to a specific resource, usually valuable items such as money, jewelry, weapons 
and sentimental material. Typically, safes and vaults require a key, PIN, or number 
combination. These factors suffer from the attacks mentioned in previous applications in 
this chapter and could instead adopt co-authentication to reduce the risk of intrusion.  
 Users with personal safes could register their smart devices and set m devices 
required to be present to open. This allows users to dictate the tradeoffs they receive 
between security strength and convenience when protecting the belongings in their 
safe.  
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Financial Institutions with vaults to protect money and safety deposit boxes could 
deploy schemes of co-authentication to ensure one single person isn’t alone with 
valuable resources at any time. By requiring not only multiple devices to authenticate 
but multiple users as well, banks can ensure better protection with a more secure 
auditing of access. 
  
3.4.4 Retail Locks 
 Retail stores lock valuable and commonly stolen merchandise in glass cabinets 
that require an employee of the store to unlock with a key. These are not carefully 
tracked and susceptible to loss by careless workers. One way to prevent lost or stolen 
retail keys from being used maliciously is to implement a scheme of co-authentication 
for authenticating to retail locks.  
 Stores could use embedded chips within nametags or smartwatches to monitor 
employee activity and broadcast notifications throughout the day. These devices could 
also be used to verify the identify of a worker and make great candidates for 
Collaborators used in conjunction with an electronic lock and key to perform co-
authentication. Electronic keys could be used solely as requesters and only given to 
designated employees. When a customer wants to purchase a locked item, an 
employee could use their key to request authentication and use their nametag and/or 
smartwatch to collaborate in the request. 
 Another implementation could do away with physical keys and require employees 
have both a smart nametag and smartwatch. Smartwatches could be picked up when a 
work shift begins and used to as a requester for locked merchandise and other 
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employee-related tasks. Nametags could be registered to employees used to identify 
them and collaborate in authentication requests. Nametags could be granted specific 
permissions and only be an acceptable collaborator when the employee is scheduled to 
work to prevent access by employees on their off time. 
  
3.5 Military Applications  
 Government and military agencies require robust physical and informational 
access control. Resources such as vehicles, buildings, weapons, information and 
intelligence need secure authentication methods for use and access. A few, non-
exhaustive, military applications that could adopt co-authentication will be briefly 
discussed in this section. 
 
3.5.1 Sensitive Networks and Classified Information 
 Accessing classified information and networks can pose national security threats. 
A lot of these databases and surveillance tools can be protected using co-authentication 
similar to the computer applications described in Section 3.1. An embodiment of co-
authentication could require a user with permissions to have multiple devices registered 
to them and require all of them to be present when authenticating to a network or 
database. This scheme could require devices manually request and collaborate in and 
each device could be protected with its own authentication factor. Once access is 
granted, a user can continuously authenticate by having their devices remain in range. 
After a period of time, the authenticator can require a manual step to verify that the user 
hasn’t left and someone else is accessing the system. An attack against this system 
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would require all user devices be stolen and authenticated separately to manually 
perform co-authentication. A government worker would likely discover that one or 
multiple devices are missing and deactivate them before any malicious actions can be 
done. 
 
3.5.2 Deployment of Military Action 
 In some cases, deploying military action that puts lives at stake should require 
approval and authentication from multiple leaders. A commonly known example 
requires two keys be turned by different people in order to prevent accidental or 
malicious launching of nuclear weapons [25]. Co-authentication embodies a solution for 
authenticating the authorization of military attacks. In a scenario where numerous 
military leaders register their personal device, specific rules could be created to achieve 
authentication. For example, a rule could allow the president of a country to request an 
action but be required to have approval by at least two generals. Another may allow a 
general to request an action on their device and only require the president collaborate in 
the approval. A situation where the president doesn’t collaborate could require the rest 
of the military leaders to approve the request. This is just one example of a possible 
implementation as co-authentication could be set up in various ways to guard the 
authorization of military action. 
 
3.5.3 Vehicle and Weaponry Authentication 
  Certain military vehicles and weapons require security mechanisms to be as 
convenient as possible for allies and as hard as possible for an adversary to access.  
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Various implementations of co-authentication can be used to achieve such a 
mechanism. Soldiers on a battlefield can be deployed with multiple devices such as a 
phone for communications, a smartwatch or tablet for communications, weapons, a 
helmet or glasses with augmented vision, GPS dog tags to locate soldiers and even 
embedded tags in their uniform clothing. These tags and devices could be used to 
continuously authenticate the soldier as a valid user and authorize the use of their 
devices.  
 By requiring the tools and devices to authenticate each other, a device stolen or 
lost can no longer be used without multiple other devices. Each group of devices for a 
given soldier could have an expiration timeout that gets reset when brought back to an 
ally base. This would prevent a stolen or lost group of tools from being used by an 
enemy. Soldiers in combat could be given a shared group to allow them to pick up a 
fallen ally weapon and still use it with their equipment while rendering it useless to an 
opponent. 
 
3.6 Group Access and Anonymous Access  
 A group of registered user devices can contain devices belonging to multiple 
people. Group access can be set up to allow multiple people in the same group to 
authenticate or to require multiple people in the same group be present to authenticate. 
Co-authentication proposes an interesting solution for group authentication that also 
provides a layer of anonymity for users. 
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3.6.1 Requiring a Group to Access 
 This scheme could be used for valuable resources that shouldn’t be left alone 
with a single user. Two or more business partners may want all members to be present 
in order to access the storage or inventory they own together. A few applications 
discussed could benefit from implementing this type of authentication scheme such as 
store managers and financial institutions that would like to require multiple users be 
present for proper checks and balances. Military applications with great implications 
such as nuclear arsenals, drones and other weapons that require multiple approvals for 
authorization might benefit from including such a scheme. 
 In an embodiment of co-authentication requiring a group to authenticate, more 
than one user must be present. A group of a users could be formed and given 
permissions such as the ability to request and/or collaborate. Each user in the group of 
users could have their own set of registered devices that they use to authenticate each 
request or collaboration with or just have one master device. For example, a scheme 
may require two users be present and require they each provide two or more of their 
own user devices to request or collaborate. Another scheme could require two or more 
users but may require that each user in the group have just one device, protected by a 
PIN or other factor. 
 
3.6.2 Group Access 
In certain circumstances where a set of users access the same resource, it may 
be more convenient to group user devices with similar permissions together. For 
instance, households may want all users of their residence to have their devices 
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registered under the same group. An embodiment of co-authentication providing group 
access could have each employee of a department register their smartphone, 
smartwatch and laptop and use them to control physical access to their department. 
Having multiple users registered in a group increases n, the number of registered 
devices, which may give an attacker more options for devices to steal but could require 
stealing devices from multiple people.  
 
3.6.3 Anonymous Access 
Depending on how the registration process was performed, group access can 
also provide a scheme to allow users to authenticate anonymously. Consider recording 
only a device identifier and a key during registration. Groups could be set up to contain 
devices from multiple different users but not have information about a particular user. 
When an Authenticator receives a request or challenge response it can only check that 
the device is in the group of trusted devices, not which specific user sent the message. 
This can be used to provide a layer of anonymity for applications where a user prefers 
their identity remain unknown. 
 
3.6.4 Human Verification 
 Websites and advertisements want to ensure that activity on their servers are 
being controlled by humans and not computer bots. Bots and botnets are used to 
control user devices and perform malicious activity on behalf of the user such as 
creating several accounts on a webserver, clicking on advertisements, etc. Proving that 
a computer is a human is often an important task to complete in order to prevent spam, 
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denial of service and other imitation acts. A recent Russian attack known as Methbot 
has been launched on advertisement companies where an army of bots imitate users 
and click on ads [5]. The attack cost advertisers $3-5 million per day and an estimated 
$180 million total [5]. 
Traditional methods for human verification take form in a captcha where a user is 
required to enter the text from a picture into a dialog box or click a checkbox saying “I 
am not a robot”. These methods can be circumvented by programmatically scanning 
webpages and using character recognition [27]. A form of co-authentication could be 
used to perform human verification. A user would register two or more of their devices 
with a trusted, reputable 3rd party verification service. When an application needs to 
prove that one of its users is a human, it could require the user click a button and 
perform co-authentication similar to the applications described in Section 3.1. Users 
click a button that starts the authentication process using the devices they have on them 
and the verification service acts as an authenticator to inform the web application 
whether the user passes as a human or not.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
ANALYSIS OF DESIGN TRADEOFFS 
 
This chapter will discuss and analyze the tradeoffs between different protocol 
designs embodied by co-authentication. Versions of the protocol may incorporate 
manual or automatic requesting and collaborating, message sending via broadcast 
messages or paired-device sending, and different variations of the communication 
protocol. 
 
4.1 Manual vs. Automatic Requesting 
 When a user or device wants to request access to the authenticator they will do 
so by sending an access request message. A scheme of co-authentication needs to 
determine if it should require authentication requests to happen automatically or by a 
manual action. Authenticators could continuously broadcast their availability while 
resources are unused and available. Devices configured for automatic requesting would 
receive a broadcast once in a certain proximity of an Authenticator and automatically 
send an access request. Authenticator broadcasts received by devices configured for 
manual requesting could prompt the user with a notification that the Authenticator is 
within range and allow the user to press a button to initiate a request. 
 Authenticators may contain input mechanisms that a user uses to initiate a 
broadcast request. For example, a door handle being pulled may trigger an 
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Authenticator broadcast that a device may manually or automatically request access to. 
This way, requests are made by a user action rather than automatically when a user is 
within proximity. 
 Depending on an application’s needs, requesting may want to be automatic or 
manual. Automatic requesting gives users the convenience of a hand-free 
authenticating solution that needs minimal user effort. Physical doors in high mobility, 
access controlled environments such as hospitals, businesses, warehouses, etc. make 
good candidates for applications using co-authentication with automatic requesting.  
Manual requesting offers users a more controlled environment and has the 
added benefit of preventing accidental requests that may occur with automatic 
requesting. Systems that cannot afford to receive accidental requests for access would 
be better suited to adopt manual requesting. Most physical and informational access 
control systems such as banks, vaults, doors, computer applications, ecommerce, etc. 
are systems that require manual requesting.  
 
4.2 Manual vs. Automatic Collaborating 
 When a user device receives an authentication challenge message it must 
complete the challenge and forward it to either another user device or an Authenticator. 
Manual and automatic requests and collaborations go hand-in-hand because 
collaborations, like requests, can be automatic or manual. Applications adopting 
automatic requesting that want to implement a completely hands-free scheme could 
also use automatic collaborating to do such. 
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 Schemes configured to automatically request may wish to use manual 
collaborating as a last verification step. This will prevent the event in which an attacker 
steals a device used to request and the user accidentally collaborates in the malicious 
request. Manually requesting and automatically collaborating is similar to the policy 
previously discussed but a device used for requesting would need a mechanism to 
prevent unwarranted requests since collaborations will be made automatically. 
Applications such as computer applications and physical doors may choose to have an 
automatic step to provide better usability.  
 Manual requesting with manual collaborations are suitable for applications with 
tighter security requirements such as group access and financial applications. By 
requiring both manual requests and collaborations, an adversary would need to steal 
multiple devices to access a user’s resources. Any scheme containing an automatic 
request or collaboration is susceptible to a single device being stolen and a user’s non-
stolen device automatically participating in co-authentication with it. 
 
4.3 Message Sending 
 Communication between devices occurs via sending messages. When a device 
needs to transmit a message to another device it can do so by either broadcasting the 
message to a proximity or by sending it to a paired-device on the same network. 
 
4.3.1 Broadcasting and Multicasting 
 There are times where devices may choose to broadcast or multicast messages 
to one another. Broadcast messages would likely be used where devices 
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communicating are doing so via proximity rather than over a network [21]. Multicast 
messages could be used by devices on a network to transmit messages to a set of 
multiple devices [21]. Broadcasting may be used by Authenticators to announce their 
availability to devices in the area. Authenticators and user devices may be configured to 
multicast challenges over a network or broadcast within proximity to allow multiple 
devices the opportunity to participate as a Collaborator. Broadcasting also allows 
devices to send messages to devices out of range by using intermediary devices to 
forward messages between the devices. 
 
4.3.2 Unicasting 
 There are implementations that may benefit by using unicasting to send 
messages to specific devices rather than broadcasting them to a range of devices [21]. 
A device using automatic requesting or collaboration with broadcasting may accidentally 
request or collaborate for a stolen user device. Unicasting allows for a more private 
communication between devices. 
 
4.4 Single Collaborator Protocol Variations 
 The order in which messages are sent and received may vary amongst different 
applications embodied by co-authentication. For instance, a system may require a 
Collaborator return the challenge response to the Authenticator instead of the 
Requester. This section will describe schemes requiring the minimum number of user 
devices, two, containing an Authenticator, Requester, and Collaborator. As shown 
depicted in Figure 2.1, there are four main message types sent between devices 
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successfully participating in co-authentication: (1) a request message coming from a 
Requester to an Authenticator, (2) an authentication challenge that the Authenticator 
generates to be completed by a Collaborator, (3) a challenge response that a 
Collaborator must transmits back to the Authenticator and (4) an authentication 
response the Authenticator must pass to the Requester. An Access Request message 
will always come from a Requester directly to an Authenticator but any other message 
type may travel between an intermediary device.  
Table 4.1 below shows possible transactions of messages for a three device 
system where A is the Authenticator, R is the Requester and C is the Collaborator. For 
example, ARC indicates a message travelled from the Authenticator to the Requester 
then from the Requester to the Collaborator. In this scheme the Requester always 
sends a request message to the Authenticator directly, but there are two transmission 
variations for challenges, challenge responses and authentication responses. In the 
table, figures labeled with an asterisk are schemes that don’t give any added benefits. 
The schemes not discussed lacked any practicality and will not be discussed. 
Table 4.1. Co-Authentication Schemes Using a Single Collaborator 
Fig. 
Access 
Request 
R à 
Authentication 
Challenge 
A à 
Challenge 
Response 
C à 
Authentication 
Response 
A à 
Name Msgs 
* A RC RA CR RCRACR 7 
4.1 A RC RA R RCRAR 6 
4.2 A RC A CR RCACR 6 
4.3 A RC A R RCAR 5 
* A C RA CR CRACR 6 
* A C RA R CRAR 5 
4.4 A C A CR CACR 5 
4.5 A C A R CAR 4 
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4.4.1 RCRAR 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram depicting RCRAR co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. Every 
communication involves the Requester. 
 
To summarize, the following scheme starts with a Requester sending an access 
request to an Authenticator. The Authenticator validates the request and generates a 
challenge for the Requester to get signed by one of its Collaborators. The Requester 
receives the challenge and forwards it to one of its registered devices. The Collaborator 
receives the challenge, signs it and returns the challenge response back to the 
Requester. The Requester passes the challenge response back to the Authenticator 
who validates the collaboration and returns an authentication response. 
The pros of this scheme are that only the requesting device communicates with 
the Authenticator. This design could be used in implementations where only certain user 
devices are used as Requesters so that stolen Collaborators cannot make requests. 
This is also helpful for instances where collaboration is done via proximity and the 
Collaborator is in range of the Requester but not the Authenticator (e.g., the 
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Collaborator may be a smartwatch that can only communicate with a paired 
smartphone). 
The cons of this design are that the Collaborator doesn’t communicate with the 
Authenticator, so it will need some way to inform the Collaborator what it’s signing for 
and to prove that the challenge is valid. 
 
4.4.2 RCACR 
 
Figure 4.2: Diagram depicting RCACR co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. A 
requesting device uses one other associated user device to collaborate in a challenge 
to successfully authenticate to a system protected by an Authenticator. 
 
To summarize, the design above is similar to Figure 4.1 in that a Requester 
sends a request to an Authenticator who generates a challenge for the Requester to get 
signed by one of its Collaborators. The difference is that instead of the Collaborator 
returning the message to the Requester, it will return it directly to the Authenticator. The 
Authenticator validates the challenge response and returns an authentication response 
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to the Collaborator containing a session key that the Collaborator will forward to the 
Requester. 
The pros of this scheme are that the Collaborator communicates directly with the 
Authenticator device.  This will allow it to receive a message from the Authenticator 
indicating what and who the session key is for and make a decision before transmitting 
it back to the Requester. 
The cons of this scheme are that it requires both the Requester and the 
Collaborator to be in range of the Authenticator, considering they are not on a network 
together. Having devices connected via LAN network rather than an ad-hoc network 
could allow devices to remotely collaborate; although, this may not be desired if a 
system wishes to require devices to be physically present during authentication. 
 
4.4.3 RCAR 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Diagram depicting RCAR co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. A 
requesting device sends an authentication challenge to one of its Collaborators who 
returns it to the Authenticator. Upon validation, the Authenticator relays an 
authentication response message back to the Requester. 
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To summarize, the scheme above depicts a design similar to Figure 4.2. The 
difference is that the authentication response is sent directly to the Requester instead of 
going through the Collaborator first. 
The pros of this scheme are that only the Requesting device would receive a 
message with a session key. The challenge the Collaborator signs could also contain a 
message indicating what resources they are collaborating for. This scheme also takes 
one less message transaction than in Figure 4.2. 
The cons of this scheme are that this design doesn’t have the Collaborator 
forward the authentication response to the Requester. This step is not necessarily 
needed but is the difference in trusting the intended use from the Requester instead of 
the Authenticator. 
 
4.4.4 CACR 
 
Figure 4.4: Diagram depicting CACR co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. An 
Authenticator communicated a challenge message with a Collaborator and the 
Collaborator forwards the authentication response back to the Requester. 
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To summarize, this design differs from the previous because instead of sending 
the authentication challenge to the Requester, the Authenticator sends it directly to the 
Collaborator. The message may contain the Requester’s identification information and 
the resource they are trying to access. The Collaborator signs the challenge and 
responds directly to the Authenticator. Once the Authenticator validates the challenge it 
responds with an authentication response containing the session key to Collaborator. 
The Collaborator may then automatically send the message to the Requester or have 
an option to manually approve the final communication. 
  The pros of this scheme is that it allows the Collaborator to receive a message 
directly from the Authenticator indicating who and what is requesting access. The 
Requester is only responsible for sending an initial request and doesn’t have to forward 
messages between the Authenticator and Collaborator. 
The cons of this scheme are that the Collaborator needs to be in range of the 
Authenticator and the Requester must be in range at least for the initial request. The 
Authenticator could also return the authentication message directly to the Requester 
without the need for an extra message to the Collaborator. 
 
4.4.5 CAR 
To summarize, this scheme is similar to the one described in the previous section 
in that the Authenticator and Collaborator communicate authentication challenges and 
challenge responses directly between each other. The difference is that instead of 
sending the authentication response to the Collaborator, the Authenticator transmits it 
directly to the Requester. 
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Figure 4.5: Diagram depicting CAR co-authentication requiring m=2 devices. The 
Authenticator sends and receives challenges with the Collaborator directly. 
 
The pros of this scheme are that the Collaborator receives the challenge directly 
from the Authenticator. There is not a last step where the Collaborator returns the 
authentication response to the Requester because it is assumed that if it signed the 
challenge it is okay with allowing access. This scheme also has the smallest cost for 
message transactions only require 4 total messages. 
The cons of this scheme are that both the Requester and Collaborator must be in 
range of the Authenticator. 
 
4.4.6 Summary of Single Collaborator Unicasting Schemes 
 Of the five schemes discussed for single collaboration using unicasting, RCRAR, 
RCACR and CAR appear to have better practical tradeoffs. RCRAR has the Requester 
send and receive messages from the Collaborator. This is desirable if a system wishes 
to have communications to Collaborators be strictly controlled by the Requester. 
RCACR is similar to RCRAR except the Collaborator returns its challenge directly to the 
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Authenticator and is responsible for forwarding the authentication response back to the 
Requester. This system has an added layer of protection because the Collaborator can 
receive a notification to accept or decline the forwarding of the access granted message 
to the Requester in the event that it becomes compromised and attempts to make a 
request. CAR is the last practical single collaborator design. In CAR, communications 
amongst Authenticators and Collaborators happens directly between the two. This 
scheme requires the least amount of communication transactions between devices and 
can inform the Collaborator what resources a Requester is attempting to access. This 
method doesn’t require any communication between Collaborators and Requesters but 
it does require that the Collaborator be in range of the Authenticator during the 
authentication process.  
 
4.4.7 Single Collaborator Broadcasting Scheme 
 
Figure 4.6: Co-authentication where an Authenticator broadcasts an availability 
message. 
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To summarize, another protocol design could be to have an Authenticator 
continuously broadcast its availability by sending a notification to devices in range. If a 
user wants to authenticate, they send a response to the Authenticator’s notification on 
both of their user devices. The authenticator could record which devices have sent a 
response in a given time period and if m devices in a group are validated, access can 
be granted.  
The pros of this scheme are that communications only happen between an 
Authenticator and a user device. User devices won’t be required to communicate with 
each other thus, an adversary wouldn’t be able to request or collaborate in co-
authentication with a valid user device without being in the same proximity. 
The cons of this scheme is that by having the Authenticator keep a count of the 
amount of validated user device could be troublesome. For example, if the Authenticator 
waits for m user devices to validate within a given time period, an adversary could just 
continuously spam requests hoping to guess m user devices or to launch a denial of 
service attack. 
 
4.5 Multiple Collaborators Protocol Variations 
All principles and concepts discussed in the previous section for single 
collaborators also apply for multiple collaborators. The question to answer now is: How 
should the second Collaborator receive the challenge? In a unicasting system, the first 
Collaborator could forward its signed challenge to the second Collaborator or the 
Requester or Authenticator could be responsible for distributing challenges amongst 
Collaborators. For instance, in Figure 4.7 below, the first Collaborator forwards its 
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completed challenge to the second Collaborator once it has finished signing. This 
scheme is similar to RCRAR as described in Section 4.4.1, but could also be configured 
to have the first Collaborator return the challenge to the Requester then from the 
Requester to the second Collaborator. 
 
Figure 4.7: RCRAR Chained Collaboration. The first Collaborator forwards its signed 
challenge to the second Collaborator to be completed. Once completed, each device 
returns the challenge to the sender they received it from. 
  
 Another unicasting design may require the Requester to send challenges directly 
to Collaborators and have challenges returned directly to the Requester. Upon receiving 
a signed challenge from one Collaborator, the Requestor could forward the message to 
the next collaborator and so on. This way challenges and responses happen directly 
between Collaborators and Requesters and wouldn’t require one Collaborator to talk to 
another. The pitfall to this method is when using messaging based on proximity and one 
of the Collaborators is not in range of the Requester, it will have no way to receive or 
return a challenge. The previous method described, RCRAR Chained Collaboration 
allows for this by letting Collaborators forward messages between each other. 
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In broadcasting systems, an Authenticator or Requester could broadcast 
messages to all Collaborators. The figure below shows a scheme in which an 
Authenticator broadcasts challenges to Collaborators upon an access request. 
Authenticators may wish to generate a challenge for the Requester as well but will have 
already validated it from the initial request message. 
 
Figure 4.8: Authenticator Broadcast scheme where an Authenticator broadcasts 
challenges to Collaborators. 
 
 Many designs can be drawn up from multiple Collaborator schemes where either 
unicasting or broadcasting and multicasting can be used to disseminate messages 
between devices. When designing schemes, a developer will want to consider how 
message transactions should occur depending on the system they are providing 
authentication for. For a high availability design, broadcasting and multicasting make 
great candidates for message sending while a more highly secure and private design 
may use unicasting to limit the transactions of messages between devices. 
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4.6 Continuous Authentication 
 Many of the aforementioned applications in Chapter 3 only require authentication 
to be performed once when an access request is made such as doors, ATMs, safes and 
other physical access controls. However, for some applications discussed, there is a 
need to continuously authenticate a user in the event that an authenticated session gets 
hijacked or abandoned and can be done using a scheme of co-authentication. In other 
words, continuous authentication can be implemented as co-authentication by requiring 
multiple devices to periodically respond to fresh challenges to the Authenticator. This 
may be set up by having the Authenticator issue new challenges to devices used in the 
original request. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary 
 Collaborative authentication is an authentication scheme for access control 
systems that takes advantage of people carrying multiple devices on their person. Co-
authentication aims to improve on traditional single-factored token authentication 
schemes by (1) mitigating vulnerability to theft-based attacks, (2) mitigating vulnerability 
to device loss and denial-of-service attacks, and (3) possibly having better usability than 
other authentication schemes.  
The scheme makes use of multiple associated user devices as hardware tokens 
to authenticate a request on a single a device. By requiring multiple devices be present 
for the authentication process, a stolen device is still unable to authenticate successfully 
without additional registered devices. Also, if a user loses or forgets a device they won’t 
be locked out of their resources because they are still able to use their other devices. 
 This thesis makes two contributions. First, this thesis worked to present a 
detailed, but non-exhaustive survey of applications well suited to use co-authentication. 
Almost any authentication application can make use of co-authentication with the rising 
amount of devices that people carry on them in their everyday lives. Chapter 3 
highlighted several applications that could gain security and usability benefits using co-
authentication over their current methods for providing authentication. 
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Many applications discussed fall under the category of physical and informational 
access control systems. Doors, vehicle gates, banks, safes, vaults, etc. are physical 
access control systems that could benefit from the use of co-authentication. 
Applications that require informational and digital access control such as computers, 
networks and webserver applications could also adopt schemes of co-authentication. 
Co-authentication also provides an interesting solution for group authentication. By 
having multiple devices registered to a group, schemes could be set up to allow multiple 
people of the group to authenticate or could require more multiple people be present in 
order to authenticate. 
Second this thesis analyzed the tradeoffs between a plethora (non-exhaustive) of 
varying designs of the authentication protocol to determine whether any design 
implementations are super clearly superior. Manual and automatic requesting and 
collaborating tradeoffs were evaluated and found that different implementations of the 
design can provide usability and security benefits depending on system needs. Single 
Collaborator unicasting and broadcasting schemes requiring m-out-of-n devices where 
m = 2 were discussed next. Protocols were evaluated on their pros and cons and found 
different protocols that may be suitable depending on an applications particular needs. 
This thesis intended to lay the groundwork for real-world applications and 
protocols using co-authentication. 
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